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The purpose of this paper is to explore the possible role of the regulatory environment in 
enhancing competition in the post-revolutionary Arab societies, drawing on the experience of 
Turkey in the last decade. The pre-revolutionary regimes in these countries are often perceived 
to entail a distorted form of competition where firms with political connections have the upper 
hand, and where profitability results not from productivity but from privileged access to scarce 
resources controlled by the political authority or from politically established barriers to 
competition.  It is well accepted that long-term growth, on the other hand, requires a system 
where creative destruction can work its way.  This requires a policy and regulatory framework 
that constrains political authority in such a way so as to limit arbitrariness and discrimination in 
policy toward firms and ensures more equal access to politically controlled resources. The 
regulatory framework needs also to redirect public authority to address various market failures 
so as to reduce barriers to entry, and, in particular, to prevent anti-competitive behavior and 
foreclosure by dominant firms. More generally, transition to a more competitive environment 
requires institutional measures to ensure that state power is used to maximize citizens’ welfare 
rather than the welfare of state elites and/or their constituencies.   
This paper will provide a review of these institutional measures. These measures—or new rules 
of the game—include remedies such as privatization, delegation of authority (in particular to 
relatively independent regulatory agencies), a competition law and its enforcement, 
liberalization, stakeholder participation in governance and monitoring, and open and non-
discriminatory procedures for public procurement. The remedies also include forms of public-
                                                     
1
 I am grateful to Ishac Diwan and participants at the Pre-Conference Workshop on the Political Economy of Arab 




private participation schemes in order to attract private capital to finance the provision of 
public services, especially in infrastructure.  In this paper, these remedies will be referred to as 
the competition-enhancing reform package. 
Significant variability across different jurisdictions notwithstanding, it would be fair to say that 
this reform package has gained global acceptance over the last three decades. Several 
developments have been instrumental in this.  One important factor has been technological 
change, in particular the emergence of the possibility of introducing competition to industries 
that had until then been organized as state monopolies, for example electricity and 
telecommunications.  The possibility of introducing competition did not mean that anti-
competitive behavior no longer posed problems.  The need to constrain anti-competitive 
behavior created a necessity for a new regulatory framework so that new entrants could have a 
chance of survival and gain market share. Another widespread reason was the desire of many 
governments to reduce the burden of infrastructure investments on the public budget and 
attract private investments instead.  Although this “public finance” motivation for the reform 
package has been underlined for emerging economies, the literature suggests that it was an 
important consideration in the case of developed economies as well.  A parallel development 
has been a tendency to seek contractual forms to shift the provision of various public services 
from within agencies of central or local governments to the private sector, in the hope that 
competition would enable the provision of these services more efficiently.  International 
organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF expressed dissatisfaction with the 
performance of public enterprises, and the political mood in some countries reflected a similar 
disappointment and saw privatization as a solution. 
These components of competition/liberalization, private participation and privatization were 
emphasized to different degrees in different jurisdictions. Hence the overriding concern in the 
European Union (EU) as a whole has been competition/liberalization, as well as the formation 
of a single market, and the emphasis on privatization has differed significantly across member 
states. The privatization component was emphasized in many World Bank and IMF programs in 
developing and transition countries, partly reflecting the ideological shifts in the post 1980 
environment, and partly reflecting the need to generate public revenues to help resolve fiscal 
and financial crises.  It would be fair to say that the reform package and especially its 
privatization component are being subject to a more critical assessment now.2  
An important political dimension of the reform package has been the delegation of substantial 
regulatory rule-making and enforcement power from ministries and ministerial departments to 
what have been called independent regulatory authorities (IRAs).  Several normative and 
positive explanations have been advanced for this transfer of power, including the insulation of 
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the regulatory process from short term political influence, deployment of mechanisms of 
credible commitment to reduce fears of expropriation, ensuring that state intervention is 
implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and without favoring firms with political 
connections, and enhancing the state’s ability to attract the necessary human capital for 
complex regulatory tasks.  Delegation of rule-making authority to IRAs was also meant to 
reduce the discretionary powers of the political authority and attain a more rule-based and 
transparent framework for economic policy.   
The paper will use Turkey as the main example from which useful lessons can hopefully be 
learnt.  The country is an interesting example because it has adopted many elements of the 
reform package in the last two decades or so.  Hence one can ask: To what extent have these 
institutional changes produced the desired results? Have adoption of new laws and 
establishment of IRAs really created a more competitive environment? Or were these changes 
merely cosmetic? It is hoped that a critical review of Turkey’s experience may provide lessons 
about the likely outcomes of similar institutional changes elsewhere. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 will review the content and institutional set-up of a 
competition enhancing reform package.  Section 3 will present an overview of the Turkish 
experience. On the basis of that experience as well as suggestions from the literature, Section 4 
will discuss some tradeoffs and challenges in pursuing reform.  Section 5 will conclude. 
2 A competition enhancing reform package  
The adoption of the elements of the competition-enhancing reform package in most developing 
countries occurred as part of a transition from an economic policy regime where the state 
played a direct role in allocating resources to one where the market mechanism was given a 
more prominent role.  From a normative point of view this required a new system of rules, or 
an overall regulatory framework to ensure that the market mechanism worked properly and 
that various forms of market failures were addressed.   
2.1 The content 
In most countries, at the heart of this new regulatory framework lies competition law which 
applies across industries a set of rules that outlaws anti-competitive agreements among firms 
and prevents dominant firms from exercising market power in an abusive manner.  The main 
logic and language of competition law has also been more or less applied to other industries 
previously organized as public monopolies and which have been liberalized to allow entry by 
new players and where market structure makes it especially easy for incumbent players who 
own or control the basic infrastructure facilities (such as transmission and distribution 
networks, or fixed or mobile telecommunications infrastructure) to foreclose markets to these 
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new players.  However, in these so-called network industries competition law has been seen as 
insufficient to ensure effective competition and most countries have enacted sector-specific 
regulations that constrain the behavior of incumbents in an ex-ante manner and that ensure 
new players non-discriminatory access to network facilities.  
In industries where the service in question does not allow meaningful competition among 
multiple service providers and where it is desired that the private sector play an active role in 
the provision of the public service in question, mechanisms have been developed to ensure that 
the concession in question is awarded to those private players who are most fit.  Hence the 
logic of competition has also been extended to public procurement.  As stated by one observer 
“the main principle in public procurement is to facilitate open and non-discriminatory 
competition with free entry” (Limi 2011, 121).  This is probably an over-simplification, since 
from the government’s perspective the procurement process starts with a decision about 
whether to produce the service in question in-house or whether to engage the private sector in 
its provision.  This is then followed by an ownership decision: should the assets be owned by 
the government or the private sector, and if by the latter, for how long?  Still, it would not be a 
mistake to state that the logic of a competitive process has become more prominent in the 
search for desirable mechanisms of procurement.  In particular, designing procedures that are 
“open and non-discriminatory” has become an important principle that guides governments. 
2.2 The institutional setup 
Replacing direct and often discretionary state control with new forms of control through rules 
and procedures corresponds to a major realignment in the structure of the state and in the way 
state power is deployed.  What made this restructuring even more drastic has been the specific 
institutional form that has accompanied it.  In most countries adoption of the reform package 
has been accompanied by the establishment of IRAs which have been delegated the power to 
design and implement many of these new rules and procedures.  Competition laws are 
enforced through independent agencies almost everywhere in the world, and IRAs have been 
established for network industries and other industries where market failures are apparent 
such as financial markets and banking industries and even other areas where governments 
interact with the private sector such as public procurement. 
The literature has identified a number of reasons behind this delegation of authority:   
1) Independence from the political realm is necessary so that regulatory objectives are 
differentiated from other political objectives.  For example, the regulation of prices to 
contain monopolistic abuse should not be contaminated with other objectives such as fight 
against inflation (Ugaz 2002).  Overall price stability is more effectively attained through 
other (monetary and fiscal) policies. 
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2) Efficient regulatory decisions can require a long-term outlook and politicians often have 
shorter term horizons (Ugaz 2002). 
3) An independent body, relative to a ministry directorate, is more effective at providing 
regulatory credibility and commitment.  Both are necessary to reduce the risk of 
expropriation in general but also specifically to reduce the risk of discrimination in favor of 
politically connected investors.  Delegating the power of regulatory authority to an IRA that 
is not under the direct control of the political authority may be an effective institutional 
measure to generate this credibility. 
4) Sector specific regulation often requires expert skills that may be difficult to attract within 
the confines of current personnel regime and pay scales of the public administration.  
Relatively independent bodies may be established with their own personnel policies. 
In what sense are IRAs supposed to be independent? First they are expected to be independent 
from politicians.  The literature has emphasized a number of formal conditions, discussed 
below, that characterize political independence, but it is also emphasized that these de-jure 
conditions do not in themselves ensure de-facto independence. Independence also refers to 
independence of IRAs from the firms that they regulate or other interest groups that have a 
stake in regulation.  The term “capture” is often used to refer to influences by various players 
that make regulatory activity produce results that are different from those that serve the public 
interest, whichever way the latter is defined.  Estache and Wren-Lewis (2010a) distinguishes 
between capture of decisions and capture of information, where the former refers to interest 
groups’ direct influence on decision makers and the latter to ability to withhold information and 
prevent it from being disclosed so as to appropriate information rents.  They also distinguish 
between ex-ante and ex-post capture: ex-ante capture refers to interest groups’ efforts to 
influence laws and regulations whereas ex-post capture occurs within the existing legal 
framework (e.g. effort to inflate costs to get higher rates).   
In reference to formal conditions of political independence the literature emphasizes the 
following (e.g. Thatcher 2011).  First, independence means that the IRA can act without the 
approval of the ministry and that the ministry cannot overturn a regulation or decision handed 
over by the IRA.  It also means that if the politicians want to change the behavior or the aim of 
IRAs, they have to do this by enacting laws rather than issuing instructions.  Second, regulators 
cannot be dismissed by ministers at will, except on the basis of wrongdoing or incapacity. 
Typically regulators are appointed (or in some jurisdictions elected) for a fixed term.  Whenever 
regulators are run by boards rather than a single director, there are often recommendations 
that board members should be appointed in a staggered manner.  The third condition 
emphasized in the literature is financial independence.  This usually means that the budget of 
the authority should not be at the discretion of the government.  This condition is often 
implemented through earmarked taxes or special revenues earmarked to the agency such as 
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license fees or penalties.  Of course, even when these conditions are met, politicians may affect 
regulatory decisions through various means.  For example, since in many jurisdictions 
appointment of regulators is a political process, this may give politicians the opportunity to 
appoint individuals who are likely to have similar preferences or who are more susceptible to 
influence.   
IRAs are not meant to be completely independent from the political realm; after all their 
creation is a political act (often a constituting piece of legislation).  The general formulation is 
that the determination of policy is carried out in the political realm and the task of the IRA is to 
design, implement and enforce the secondary legislation through which the policy is realized. 
Independence from the political realm also does not mean that IRAs are not accountable.  
Again, the literature lists a number of measures to ensure accountability.  A classic list is 
provided by Smith (1997, 1): 
 Rigorous transparency—including open decision-making and publication of decisions 
and the reasons for those decisions 
 An appeals process 
  Scrutinize the agency's budget, usually by the legislature 
  Prohibit conflicts of interest 
  Subject the regulator's conduct and efficiency to scrutiny by external auditors or other 
public watchdogs3 
These can be taken as the basic measures to ensure the independence and accountability of 
IRAs.  The institutional design of IRAs contains additional variables or dimensions that need to 
be decided on and how variations along those dimensions are likely to affect IRAs’ performance 
has been a subject of debate. These dimensions will be discussed in the sequel. 
3 The experience of Turkey 
Turkey’s transition to a market oriented policy regime started in the 1980s.  Before that Turkey 
was pursuing a model of import substitution industrialization with widespread state 
intervention through direct production and various forms of price controls, subsidies and 
directed credit.  The economic presence of the state notwithstanding, however, the role of the 
private sector was important.  In fact, the objective of state intervention was partly to help 
develop private industry, and private industry did develop albeit in a highly concentrated, 
oligopolistic and internationally uncompetitive manner.   
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Hence when Turkey started to move towards a more market oriented economic policy regime 
in the 1980s, there was already a relatively developed private sector led by diversified holding 
companies owned by dynastic families.  Most of these holding companies actually developed 
starting in the 1950s.  This followed a move from a single party to a multi-party regime—a 
decision taken in 1945—and in the election in 1950 the opposition won with a landslide and 
there was a change in the government.  In any case, although not independent of the state and 
possibly highly dependent on it for capital accumulation as well as critical inputs, by the 1980s 
the private sector in Turkey was an important locus of economic and social power.4  
3.1 From discretionary capitalism to institutional reform5 
In the 1980s barriers to international trade and finance were reduced or removed, so were 
controls on domestic financial markets and more specifically on the banking system. However 
during the 1980s and 1990s governments in Turkey did not show a deep interest in developing 
a solid legal and regulatory framework for a market economy.6  This was especially true for the 
financial markets. The liberalization of the capital account itself was carried out without the 
approval of the central bank (and against warnings that liberalizing international finance under 
conditions of macroeconomic instability was not a good idea).  The banking sector expanded 
rapidly without an effective system that would ensure that excessive risk-taking would be 
curtailed.  This was especially relevant given the availability of arbitrage opportunities provided 
by borrowing in foreign currency and investing these funds into domestic assets, especially 
government securities bearing high real interest rates, reflecting some sort of collusion 
between the banking industry and fiscally profligate governments (Alper and Onis 2004).  The 
weakness of regulation of the banking system not only encouraged excessive risk-taking, but 
also allowed several cases of gross corruption where banks assets were siphoned off by bank 
managers and owners (Atiyas and Emil 2005).  Along with deterioration of public finances (see 
below) the weaknesses in the banking system was among the primary triggers of the financial 
crisis of 2000-2001. 
Attempts to privatize state assets were undertaken through half-baked laws and often through 
decrees with the force of law.  Governments basically tried to give substantial discretion to the 
executive or to specific agencies controlled by the executive, on the procedures and 
methodologies to be followed in the privatization process; in effect, they would have allowed 
governments to pursue privatizations in unaccountable and un-transparent ways.  Most of 
these efforts were met by annulments by the Constitutional Court, in most cases on the 
grounds that the laws or decree-laws effectively transferred legislative authority to the 
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executive: in other words, the Constitutional Court demanded that details of the procedures to 
be followed during privatizations, the options available regarding privatization methods and the 
like should be explicitly stated in the law and should not be left to the discretion of the 
executive.  In short, then, given a choice between rules versus discretion, the governments of 
1980s and 1990s were clearly in favor of discretion.    
Throughout the 1990s there were attempts to pursue privatizations or private participation in 
telecommunications and electricity without first establishing a regulatory framework to contain 
the exercise of monopoly power or to ensure the development of competition. With regards to 
the energy sector, governments tried to attract private capital through various contractual 
schemes entailing7 monopoly rights and government take or pay guarantees.  Some of these 
contracts were awarded without a competitive tender procedure.  These contracts have been 
later investigated by the High Court of Accounts and criticized for high costs, possible 
irregularities and incompatibility with competitive markets (Atiyas 2005). The contingent fiscal 
liabilities generated by these contracts also caused concerns. 
What happened in the fiscal area during the 1990s can be best characterized by fragmentation 
and disintegration.  The political science literature on Turkey has emphasized the importance of 
populism and patronage in political competition.  In terms of fiscal policy, this means that the 
use of public resources to nurture political support is a central instrument of political 
competition.  This puts pressure on public finances and creates a strong tendency to generate 
public deficits.  Towards the end of 1990s budget “unity” broke down completely: there were 
various forms of off-budget expenditures, especially through state-owned banks in the form of 
support for agriculture and small enterprises.  The real magnitude of these quasi-fiscal 
expenditures and their implied burden on the budget and public debt were at the time not 
shown in official statistics and disclosed to the public.  It is generally accepted that hidden 
public debt also played an important role in the events leading to the crisis of 2000-2001.8  
Overall, then, it can be said that while the scope of state intervention decreased in the 1980s 
and 1990s relative to the previous few decades, this period was nevertheless characterized by 
discretionary rather than a rule based policy environment.  There were important initiatives 
during this period which were exceptions to this characterization. The first was the 
establishment of the Capital Markets Board (CMB) in 1982 to develop and regulate securities 
markets in Turkey. The CMB was the first independent regulatory authority (IRA), and, as 
discussed by Atiyas and Ersel (1994), it was evident that, since it entailed delegation of 
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significant rule-making authority away from the government and ministries, it represented a 
counter-example to the centralization of policy making authority that characterized most of the 
1980s and 1990s. One possible explanation for this move is the rapid and uncontrolled growth 
of non-bank financial institutions from 1980-81, which subsequently resulted in the “bankers’ 
crisis” of 1982, and lead to a loss of popular confidence in the non-bank financial system. CMB 
was seen as necessary to restore the confidence without which capital markets could not 
develop. The development of capital markets was seen in turn as a necessary component of the 
economic transformation the country was going through in the post-1980 period.   
The second initiative was the enactment of a competition law in 1994 and the establishment of 
the Competition Authority in 1997. These moves can be explained by Turkey’s commitments 
under the Customs Union with the EU in 1996. Indeed, as will be discussed in more detail 
below, the path towards EU accession (as well as pressures from international agencies such as 
the IMF and the World Bank) played major roles in the evolution of Turkish economic 
institutions. 
The program that was launched after the crisis of 2000-2001 entailed a number of significant 
institutional measures. In a way, the program adopted the “second generation reforms” 
proposed by international organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank, but by and large 
the reforms also coincided with those that Turkey had to pursue as a country in the process of 
accession toward membership to the European Union.  Many of these reforms which were part 
of the recovery program launched in 2001 were adopted without much change and even 
extended by the AKP government that came to power after the elections of 2002. 
One of the most important steps undertaken in the reform program was to introduce 
independence of the central bank.  A supportive fiscal policy stance played an important role in 
the success of monetary policy. A Public Financing and Debt Management Law adopted in 2002 
subjected all central government borrowing and guarantees to strict rules and imposed 
reporting requirements on all debts and guarantees.   The Public Financial Management and 
Control Law passed in December 2003 consolidated all fiscal operations of the government in 
an integrated general government approach, from the preparation to the closing stages of the 
budget.  It also envisaged a three-year budget framework.  These are measures that 
substantially improve fiscal control and transparency of the budget process.  To the extent that 
any expenditure has to be executed within an established budget process and in a transparent 
manner, and therefore would be scrutinized by the public, it can be said that these measures 
also limit the discretionary powers of the executive.  Overall the governments in the post-crisis 
era have been very successful in implementing a large fiscal adjustment even though observers 
have identified a significant number of slippages in the implementation of the new fiscal 
framework (Dedeoglu 2010). 
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Another critical dimension of the post-crisis program was strengthening the supervision and 
regulation of the banking system.  The Banking Regulation and Supervision Authority (BRSA) 
was established in 1999 but its powers were significantly increased after the crisis.  It has 
engineered a massive recapitalization of the banking system and has earned a reputation for 
being a strong regulator, a sharp contrast with the weak regulatory environment in the 
previous two decades.  Tight regulation of the banking system is generally seen as a major 
factor behind the resilience of the financial sector in Turkey during the 2008-2009 global crisis.  
Regarding competition proper, as mentioned above, a Competition Law, modeled after that of 
the EU, was already enacted in 1994 as part of a Customs Union with the EU. The Competition 
Authority is recognized to be a professionally competent and relatively independent agency, 
not only by domestic stakeholders, but by international peers as well (OECD 2005).  The 
decisions of the Competition Board are required to be publicly available and published with 
justifications, which increases the transparency and accountability of the agency. This may have 
created an added source of discipline that has improved its performance. Maintaining 
independence may have also been easier due to the fact that it functions across many 
industries and does not deal in a continuous manner with a specific enterprise or groups of 
enterprises, a situation that could have facilitated capture.9   This does not mean that there are 
no shortcomings: there are instances of favoritism towards state owned enterprises, 
inconsistencies in decisions across cases or over time, insufficient or sometimes deficient 
economic analysis, excessive formalism and the like.  Nevertheless these shortcomings do not 
change the basic fact that overall the agency’s decisions are seen to be free of systematic bias  
and they meet a minimum level of quality, at least relative to the rest of the RAs in Turkey. 
In the area of privatization, by the end of the 1990s the legal infrastructure was almost 
complete.  In effect, the executive had been forced to reduce the degree of administrative 
discretion and establish more transparent and accountable procedures for privatization. In 
addition, as discussed below, by 2001 legal regulatory frameworks were also established for the 
deregulation and privatization of industries which were hitherto dominated by public 
monopolies, namely telecommunications and energy.  While privatization revenues generated 
until 2000 were below $9 billion, more than $30 billion has been raised between 2001-2010 
(Onis 2011).  Among privatized assets were large enterprises in industries such as 
petrochemicals, petroleum refinery, telecommunications, electricity distribution, banking, and 
alcohol and tobacco products.   
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Overall, privatizations in Turkey have been revenue-driven.  The problem with revenue-driven 
privatizations is that the governments may overlook competition problems or indeed may 
endow enterprises to be privatized with monopoly rents in order to increase privatization 
revenues.  The Competition Authority has been involved in the privatization process and has 
been able to influence some privatization transactions to ensure that measures are undertaken 
to reduce competition problems that may arise once assets are turned over to private 
ownership.  For example during the privatization of Turk Telekom the Competition Authority 
has required that the provision of internet services be organized as a separate legal entity and 
that the cable TV infrastructure be separated from Turk Telekom. More recently, the 
Competition Authority has prevented investors from owning both gas and electricity 
distribution companies in the same region.  The idea here was that under separate ownership 
gas and electricity distribution companies may enter each other’s business areas and thereby 
give rise to a competitive process, whereas placing them under the ownership of a single 
investor will prevent the development of this form of competition.  In tradable industries such 
as cement as well, The Competition Authority has taken decisions that has influenced 
privatization outcomes and have prevented the sale of enterprises to groups whose purchase of 
these assets would have created or enhanced dominance. 
In industries characterized by natural monopoly segments such interventions by the 
Competition Authority have limited influence on market outcomes; ultimately the evolution of 
market structure depends on the existence and effective implementation of a regulatory 
framework that protects competition, ensures access to network facilities by new entrants, 
presents exclusionary and discriminatory behavior by incumbents, etc.  As discussed below, 
these competition-enhancing aspects of institutional change in industries characterized by 
competition problems have not been very strong in Turkey. 
In the telecommunications industry, at the risk of oversimplifying, the story is one of substantial 
capture by the fixed line incumbent operator. The Telecommunications Authority (now the 
Information and Communications Technologies Authority, ICTA) was established in 2001 and 
Turk Telekom was privatized in 2005.  Privatization has possibly resulted in a significant increase 
in productivity of Turk Telekom: Employment was reduced by almost 50 percent after 
privatization, reflecting the extent of politicization and over-employment under state 
ownership. However, Turk Telekom maintains dominance in the broadband internet services 
market (over 90 percent market share) as well as long distance and International calls markets 
(more than 50 percent market share).  Until very recently Turk Telekom was protected from 
competition by high interconnection rates, delays in the licensing of new entrants, delays in the 
introduction of services that would allow new entrants greater command over the range of 
services that can be provided over the fixed line network.  To most observers, these outcomes 
reflect Turk Telekom’s influence over the Ministry of Transport and by consequence, over the 
12 
 
IRA. While the telecommunications laws contained standard measures that have ensured ICTA‘s 
de-jure independence, the authority’s de-facto independence was significantly curtailed (Atiyas 
and Doğan 2010).    
However, the stance of the ICTA in the mobile industry provides and interesting contrast.  
Compared to the fixed segment the ICTA has adopted a more competitive stance in the mobile 
segment, as reflected, for example, in interconnection rates which have been quite low by 
international standards.  Atiyas and Doğan (2010) argue that this may reflect the fact Turk 
Telekom’s subsidiary is a new entrant in the mobile telecommunications markets. The 
interesting point here is that, if the ICTA’s more aggressive pursuit of competition in the mobile 
industry can indeed be explained by political economic factors, this stance was carried out 
through the established rules of the game (i.e. lower interconnection rates) rather than by 
more coarse and discretionary interventions. In other words, the ICTA’s tendency to favor Turk 
Telekom was curtailed by the new rules and had to be mediated by an overall more competitive 
stance.  This suggests that perhaps the new rules did have some bite after all. 
In electricity, the restructuring process in Turkey started with the adoption of the Electricity 
Market Law in 2001 which envisaged unbundling of distribution, transmission and generation 
assets, establishment of non-discriminatory access to the transmission and distribution 
networks and the formation of Energy Market Regulatory Authority (EMRA), the IRA 
responsible for electricity, natural gas and oil industries.   
The electricity restructuring process has been driven by privatization.  Privatizations themselves 
have been structured so as to generate maximum possible revenues for the government.  As a 
result, competition and consumer welfare has taken a secondary role, since there is a danger 
that high purchase prices will eventually reflect themselves in higher consumer prices. 
Privatizations have been delayed significantly, and privatization of generation assets, where 
productivity increases are most likely to occur as a result of competition, has not even started.  
Hence, in fact, ten years after the launch of the restructuring process, the extent of competition 
is still limited to about one quarter of generation capacity, the rest of the capacity being either 
under non-competitive contracts inherited from the past, or under government ownership. 
Moreover, the government is still perceived to be quite active in setting some of the retail 
prices while in principle this should be under the authority of the EMRA. 
It should be stressed that it is not government ownership of these assets that prevents the 
development of competition: there are examples of countries where governments own 
significant parts of generation assets but still have competitive markets. What Turkey could 
have done is to horizontally break up and corporatize these assets, place them under 
competent management and give them the mandate of behaving in a competitive manner.  The 
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primacy of privatization as the driving force of the restructuring process has precluded this 
option.   
These problems notwithstanding, the restructuring model has been successful in attracting new 
investments in capacity by the private sector without any non-competitive contracts, of the 
order 3-4000 MW each year since 2008.  This is largely due to the fact that under the new 
model a wholesale market was established where prices are determined by supply and 
demand.  In effect, the establishment of a wholesale market meant that the government 
relinquished a significant tool that could in principle be used for expropriation or favoritism.  
In the area or procurement, Turkey has adopted a Public Procurement Law (PPL) in 2002, 
largely modeled after the EU Public Procurement Directives. Again, the accession process has 
been an important motivation in the adoption of the Law, and ostensibly in the many 
amendments that have been implemented since then.  The PPL permits domestic preferences; 
there is a price advantage of up to 15% for domestic contractors offering domestic products. In 
procedures for contracts below the thresholds, contracting authorities may restrict 
participation to Turkish companies. The number of amendments since has been high, and as 
reported by SIGMA (2008) “some of these amendments were introduced on an ad hoc basis by 
individual ministries and Parliamentarians rather than as part of an overall government 
strategy. These amendments have introduced exemptions that had not been envisaged under 
the acquis communautaire.”  Importantly, private sector utilities (in the water, energy, 
transport and telecommunications sectors) are not covered in the PPL.  The PPL also 
established a Public Procurement Authority. SIGMA’s (2008) assessment of the PPA was that it 
was a “stable and strong institution. It has already largely contributed to the establishment of a 
modern public procurement system and, in general, has the capacity to implement 
procurement legislation effectively.” Recently investigations were launched against some PPA 
staff and a member of the Board on the grounds that they have accepted bribes from business 
people and engaged in corruption in close to 100 public tenders. 
In most cases discussed above, the delegation of regulatory authority to a relatively 
independent agency resulted in an overall increase in the transparency of the policy making 
process.  Even though there are variations across IRAs, they generally work in a more 
transparent manner relative to ministries:  putting draft regulations up on websites for public 
consultation has become routine.  To different degrees, the decision making processes of IRAs 
are bound by procedural rules that are encoded in regulations; such rules reduce discretion and 
enhance predictability. The Competition Agency and the ICTA are required to provide 
justifications for their decisions.  Requiring IRAs to provide justifications for their decisions 
makes a major contribution to transparency and accountability and makes judicial reviews 
more effective and credible.  Even though implementation differs across agencies (more 
14 
 
effective implementation in the case of the Competition Authority), this requirement allows 
stakeholders to be more demanding in terms of transparency. 
There is one area where developments regarding transparency and accountability have been in 
the reverse direction, and that is the case of the Housing Development Administration (TOKI).   
TOKI is directly attached to the Prime Ministry. It builds public housing with the collaboration of 
private contractors.  It has free access to public land and wide discretionary powers over land 
that is under its control.  Construction activities of TOKI are exempt from the Public 
Procurement Act; TOKI is also exempt from the Public Financial Management and Control Law.  
It has been reported that its assets have reached about 2% of GDP, though financial 
information about its activities is hard to find because of lack of financial reporting.10 While 
most of the IRAs reported above are audited by the High Court of Accounts (Sayıştay), which 
reports to the Parliament, TOKI is audited by the High Audit Board (Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu), 
which is attached to the Prime Ministry, implying that the financial transactions and activities of 
TOKI are not being audited by an independent body.  It is also known to be an efficient 
developer and has built over half a million residences, 85% of which consists of social housing. 
In short, TOKI has the ability to manipulate land rent in a highly discretionary and non-
transparent manner meanwhile supporting a network of construction companies.   
3.2 Assessment 
The review presented above suggests a number of comments.  The first has to do with the role 
of crises.   The fact that economic crises facilitate or sometimes trigger a process of economic 
policy reform has been emphasized frequently in the literature and in that sense Turkey is no 
exception.  It is interesting to note that central bank independence, regulation of the banking 
system and measures that enhanced the controllability of the budget figured prominently in 
the aftermath of the crisis of 2000-2001 as these were among the most problematic areas prior 
to the crisis. The second aspect that needs to be emphasized is the role of international 
agencies and especially of the European Union.  The IMF and the World Bank played a 
significant role in the adoption of the reform laws in many areas including telecommunications 
and electricity, but the prospect of membership to the EU played a crucial role: It increased 
acceptance of and created legitimacy for reform and at the same time it vastly reduced 
transaction and bargaining costs among stakeholders in Turkey by providing templates of what 
was largely perceived as best practices in a wider range of areas including telecommunications, 
energy, competition law, banking and public procurement.  Third, it is clear that the Turkish 
experience towards a more rule-based policy environment has been an uneven process.  Even 
though most IRAs were given formal independence, de-facto independence varied significantly 
across agencies.  Still, even in cases where independence was more nominal than real, the mere 
                                                     
10
 See Atiyas (2012) for more details. 
15 
 
existence of a new set of rules and formal institutional arrangements seems to have helped 
these industries to become more competitive. This is suggested by the experience in the mobile 
industry and wholesale electricity markets mentioned above.   
While this paper has emphasized the institutional dimensions of enhancing competition, the 
Turkish experience does underlie the importance and complementarity of the broader 
economic policy framework.   After all the institutional and competition enhancing measures 
described above were undertaken in an environment of more or less liberalized product and 
financial markets, a process that started in the 1980s.  Liberalization of domestic markets was 
complemented by liberalization of foreign trade and international finance.  As examined in 
Atiyas and Bakış (2013, 2012), however, both labor productivity and total factor productivity 
increased faster in the 2000s relative to the 1980s and 1990s, perhaps reflecting improvements 
both in the institutional environment and macroeconomic stability in the last decade.    
Finally, it is not yet clear whether the emergence of these institutions represents a new 
equilibrium and whether they are compatible with the underlying political institutions in 
Turkey.  The important role of the perspective of EU accession was mentioned above.  This 
perspective has been weakening in recent years and it remains to be seen how this will  affect 
the conduct of economic policy in Turkey.  Recently there are signs that the government may 
be considering steps that will reduce the powers of IRAs.  The government recently passed a 
decree law which authorized ministries to “inspect” the activities of agencies associated with 
the ministries.  The decree law gives ministries the authority to harass agencies by subjecting 
them to inspections.  These inspections would concentrate primarily on procedural and not 
substantial issues. More importantly, ministries still cannot overturn IRA decisions.  However, it 
is very possible that this power to inspect will be used to curtail the de-facto independence of 
IRAs.  In addition, several members of the governing party and the Prime Minister have been 
quoted in the press complaining about the excessive authority of the IRAs and the fact that they 
lack political accountability.     
4 Evaluation: trade-offs and challenges of enhancing competition  
This section will discuss some elements and tradeoffs that need to be considered in the design 
and implementation of a competition-enhancing reform program. It will try to draw on lessons 
from theory, the Turkish experience, and empirical studies.   
4.1 A brief review of empirical evidence 
Empirical evidence on the role of IRAs on economic outcomes generally focus on infrastructure 
industries.  There is quite a bit of evidence that there is a positive correlation between the 
presence of an independent regulator and sectoral performance.  Many studies focus on the 
16 
 
telecommunications industry.  In a widely cited paper, Wallsten (2001) examines the effect of 
privatization and regulation in the telecommunications industry of 34 African and Latin 
American countries. He finds that privatization in the presence of an independent regulator is 
positively correlated with telecom performance measures such as connection capacity, 
penetration and labor productivity. Privatization alone, however, is associated with few 
benefits, and is negatively correlated with connection capacity.  A positive correlation between 
the presence of an independent regulator and sector performance, especially penetration, has 
been found in other studies as well, see Estache and Wren-Lewis (2010b, 2009) for reviews.  
The impact of IRAs however does depend on the details of the regulatory framework.  For 
example Estache and Rossi (2005) focuses on the electricity industry and finds that privatization 
with the existence of an independent regulator utilizing incentive regulation is associated with 
higher efficiency relative to firms under public ownership.  By contrast, the efficiency of 
privatized firms under rate of return regulation is not significantly different from those of the 
public firms.  More recently, Cambini and Rondi (2011) look at investment rates of utilities in 
Europe and find that regulatory independence has a positive effect on investment.  
Another way in which the presence of an IRA may affect economic outcomes is that they may 
reduce transactions costs.  Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2007, 2008) find that the existence of 
an independent regulator decreases the extent of renegotiation of concession contracts in the 
water and transport sectors.  The reason could be that the presence of a regulator may have 
improved the contract design to begin with, which in turn would reduce future conflicts.  Also, 
under the presence of a regulator, disputes may be handled within the regulatory framework, 
with no need to change the initial contract. 
There is also some evidence on factors that influence the degree of formal independence of 
regulatory authorities.  In a recent study using data from 175 IRAs worldwide from seven 
industries , Hanretty and Koop (2012) find that independence is more likely or higher in utilities 
and financial markets.  Independence is positively associated with “replacement risk” which 
captures the frequency with which governments are replaced with governments with different 
partisan compositions.  In countries where replacement risk is high and consequently policies 
may change frequently, delegation may enhance policy stability, which will have a positive 
effect on investments.  Independence is also negatively associated with the number of veto 
players in the political system.  This is captured, for example, by the number of parties in 
government, the number of constitutional bodies that may influence policy (such as the 
number of legislatures), the degree of homogeneity of parties in the parliament, etc.  The 
reasoning behind the negative correlation is that the higher number of veto players may be a 
functional equivalent of more independence in delegation, because more veto players make 
policy changes and reversals more difficult, reducing the need for independence of IRAs. These 
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results in general provide support to theories that see delegation to IRAs as a solution to 
regulatory credibility and risk of expropriation. 
A few studies attempt to measure the association between formal and de-facto independence, 
but here the problem is that measuring the degree of de-facto independence on a consistent 
basis across countries is very difficult.  In the limited number of studies on Europe, the relation 
between formal and de-facto independence is found to be weak. Given this weak relationship, 
the fact that many studies have found a positive relation between the presence of an 
independent regulator and economic performance mentioned above is interesting.  
There is also evidence that the regulatory environment interacts with other characteristics of 
the political environment.  One important variable in that regard is the extent of corruption.  
Wren-Lewis (2011) examines the impact of corruption on the efficiency of electricity 
distribution companies in Latin America and the Caribbean but this paper also examines 
whether that impact depends the institutional environment, namely ownership of the 
distribution assets and the establishment of IRAs.  The theoretical analysis shows that 
corruption should have a negative effect on efficiency.  The impact of degree of independence 
of the agency, however, depends on the relative corruptability of agencies versus politicians.  
For the specific case of electricity distribution companies in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Wren-Lewis (2011) finds that the overall degree of corruption does indeed have a negative 
impact on the efficiency of distribution companies.  Moreover, the presence of an IRA 
significantly reduces this effect.  Privatization is also found to lower the negative effect of 
corruption on efficiency, but this finding is not robust to controlling for the endogeneity of 
ownership.   
4.2 The politics of enhancing competition 
Institutional reform has a basic paradox: Important elements of the competition enhancing 
reform package entails delegating substantial discretionary authority from the ministers and 
agencies that they control to IRAs.  Assuming that the IRAs are more independent then 
ministerial departments, the delegation therefore entails significant dispersion of previously 
centrally held political power.  Hence while delegation is partly to ensure that regulatory 
decisions are insulated from political influence the paradox is that at the same time, this act of 
delegation itself is a political act.  The question is:  when is such delegation in the interests of 
those who currently hold political authority? That is, when is delegation incentive compatible 
with political power? 
Both the theory and empirics behind IRAs suggest a few answers to this question: An important 
dimension of the act of delegation is an increase in regulatory credibility and a decrease in 
expropriation risk. This suggests that governments will be interested in delegating if they have a 
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strategic interest in attracting private capital, both domestic and foreign.  This may be true for 
several reasons.  The cost of public finance or the existing level of public debt may be high. Or 
governments may be interested in allocating public funds primarily to social sectors such as 
education, health, poverty alleviation or even support for SMEs, and rely on private investment 
for infrastructure industries.   Hence the “public finance” motive for liberalization would also 
favor the creation of a competitive environment.  Even there the political elite always have the 
alternative of striking special deals with individual investors and share monopoly rents.  The 
cost of that would be slower growth, so governments under a popular mandate and political 
pressure to deliver high growth would have better incentives to create a competitive 
environment.  In addition, enhancing the competitive environment would also create a more 
conducive setting for the growth of small and medium enterprises. For these reasons one might 
think that post-revolutionary Arab societies would contain the correct political incentives for 
improving the level of competition.  
Another possibility is that governments may be interested in encouraging the competitive 
process in some industries while continuing to regulate the creation and distribution of rents in 
others.  This seems to be part of the story behind the experience in Turkey.  It seems that the 
government opted in favor of competition in tradable sectors as well as (at least to a degree) in 
electricity and telecommunications while continuing to play a much bigger role in construction 
and urban development.  
Assuming that those who hold political power are convinced of the necessity of reform, one still 
has to consider the issue of broader popular political support.  The global experience seems to 
suggest that public support for the adoption of a regulatory reform program is not a major 
constraint.  Assuming that the reforming government is willing and has a winning coalition in 
the legislature, the adoption of the program can only be hindered through popular discontent 
expressed through mass protests that create political instability and perhaps violence. This is 
not likely to occur save for a few components or instances such as privatization that is expected 
to create substantial unemployment, which is an eventuality that may generate substantial 
resistance from labor and trade unions. It should be possible and relatively easy to deal with 
this problem by including in the reform program well designed labor adjustment programs that 
aim at compensating the losers.  With significant expected productivity increases from 
privatization, financing such programs should not be that difficult.11  Privatization has other 
potential political hazards that the literature has identified, these will be mentioned below.  The 
rest of the regulatory reform program is not likely to generate significant political sentiments 
that would result in mass protests.  
                                                     
11
 After the privatization of Turk Telekom, the incumbent telecom operator in Turkey, employment was reduced by 
almost 50 percent. This did not create an uproar thanks to a program that gave options to workers either to opt 
out with a hefty severance pay or find employment elsewhere in the government.  
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Popular support for the sustainability of the program is a different game because in the 
medium term popular opposition and discontent cannot be disconnected from electoral 
politics; if there is popular discontent with the program then the opposition may win elections 
on an anti-reform program and the program may be reversed. In the medium term the main 
means through which popular support can be maintained seems to be through successful 
implementation of the regulatory reform program: if public services are successfully provided 
and if access to services is successfully enhanced, this should be an important factor that 
ensures public support. In any case, over the medium term one should expect a positive 
concordance in the sense that successful reform would generate its own political support.  But 
this potential of positive concordance also suggests a constraint: the reform has to deliver over 
a reasonable time frame if it is going to be politically sustainable. This can be called the 
deliverability constraint.  Note that while partly a technical issue, high level of delivery also 
hinges on ability to curb capture and corruption.   
Political support for the reform as well as the degree of success in implementation is also 
related with the way in which reform is carried out. In many developing countries regulatory 
reforms are adopted during or immediately after major economic crises, often as part of 
conditionality imposed by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF.  As 
discussed above, this was certainly the case in Turkey (see Ozel and Atiyas, 2011) for 
telecommunications and electricity.  This is often done without much discussion and in a top 
down manner.  Laws are typically prepared by relatively small teams of believers, with little or 
no public consultation.  In fact, the Turkish experience suggests that the reforming team often 
carries out its work in secrecy exactly because of fear of resistance from the rest of the political 
(and bureaucratic) elite.  This is expedient in the short run: If the government has a majority in 
the enacting body, swift adoption is assured.  The Turkish experience also suggests that lack of 
wider ownership creates major hazards over the medium term which also hurts the 
deliverability constraint. This works in various ways.  First, secrecy and bypass creates 
resentment, and resentment of the bureaucracy creates resistance and hurts implementation.  
More importantly, bypass also prevents the establishment of a common understanding about 
the objectives of the program and more importantly how the various parts of the program fit 
together.  For example restructuring in the electricity industry is quite a complicated project 
consisting of multiple dimensions.  Consistency among these dimensions hence is a must.  
However, in the case of Turkey it took a tremendous amount of time for the bureaucracy (and 
even the private sector) to really understand the different dimensions of the restructuring 




4.3 The role of privatization (vs. liberalization) 
The Turkish experience suggests that the role of privatization in curbing inefficiency and 
capture in industries where competition is limited or non-existent was exaggerated.  The 
literature suggests that (under contractual incompleteness) relative to private ownership, 
public ownership performs better for allocative efficiency and worse for productive (or cost) 
efficiency (e.g., Schmidt 1996). Hence regulators and policymakers face a trade-off. In the case 
of Turkey, electricity distribution suffered from high electricity losses and theft. They are being 
privatized and their tariffs are subject to incentive regulation with loss targets.  If companies 
can decrease losses to levels beyond the targets, their profits increase.  This is a potentially high 
powered incentive to cut costs, but the obvious welfare loss is the surplus that is captured by 
the distribution companies.  This is a clear example of the efficiency-rent extraction trade-off 
discussed in the literature on regulation under asymmetric information (e.g., Laffont and Tirole 
1993).  
 Martimort and Straub (2009) also suggest that collusion between regulators and private firms 
may lead firms to appropriate a larger share of increases in efficiency in the form of higher 
prices, especially for firms in sectors involving large fixed costs and requiring high mark-ups to 
cover total costs (such as water, roads, port and airport construction). The authors suggest that 
this result may explain the widespread dissatisfaction with privatization in Latin America even 
though many studies find that privatization leads to efficiency increases.  
This is not meant to suggest that the public finance justification for privatization (i.e., 
privatization to raise revenues) may not be justified under certain circumstances.  The purpose 
here is to suggest that, absent competition, the benefits of privatization may be exaggerated 
and that under certain circumstances it is worthwhile to think of alternatives, especially public 
management reform, corporatization, etc. 
4.4 Separation of powers and the special role of a competition authority 
In the literature on regulation under asymmetric information, one way to ensure that the (non-
benevolent) regulator acts in the public interest is to make the payments made to the regulator 
contingent on the report that the regulator provides to the government on the costs of the 
firm.12  As emphasized by Dal Bo (2006) making contingent payments to regulators is not a 
realistic option.  An alternative proposed by Laffont and Martimort (1999) is the separation of 
regulatory powers.  The Turkish experience actually seems to support this suggestion.   
                                                     
12
 The non-benevolent regulator is modeled as the middle layer of the three-layer principal agent hierarchy with a 
(benevolent) government at the top, a firm with private cost information at the bottom, and the regulator.  The 
regulator obtains a private signal about the cost of the firm and reports that to government.  However, the firms 
can bribe the regulator into reporting false information, or claiming to have generated no information.   
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In Turkey the competition authority and sector-specific regulators have quasi-concurrent 
powers over anti-competitive behavior in the regulated industries.  Of course, the existence of 
concurrent powers is likely to increase regulatory uncertainty whenever the respective agencies 
reach conflicting verdicts on specific issues.  Separation of powers may also lead into inter-
agency conflict and push agencies into a power struggle to maximize their jurisdiction. It may 
also induce firms in the regulated industries firms to abuse the separation of powers by picking 
and choosing agencies so as to maximize the likelihood of a favorable decision.  In the Turkish 
case the degree of regulatory uncertainty has been reduced through a division of labor that has 
emerged over time: the competition authority has come to limit its intervention into areas of 
market behavior that are not directly regulated by the sector-specific agencies.  This of course 
reduces the welfare enhancing impact of separation of powers, but this loss of impact can 
partly be compensated by vesting the competition authority with a strong advocacy role.  
Under an advocacy duty, the authority submits its opinions in areas where it has no direct 
jurisdiction.  It turns out that such opinions can have a critical role in increasing the overall 
transparency and accountability of the regulatory system.   
Note that even when regulatory agencies are not corrupt, sector specific regulators and the 
competition authority may legitimately have somewhat different preferences: For example, 
electricity or telecommunications regulators may have an interest in network expansion and 
they may attach a lower weight to the development of competition in their respective 
industries. A critical dimension of the separation of powers problem is to place the authority to 
regulate mergers and acquisitions under the competition authority.  Mergers and acquisitions 
potentially play a critical role in the evolution of market structure and are critical determinants 
of the degree of competition in the medium and long term.  Undue increase in concentration 
raises the likelihood of anti-competitive behavior and it becomes much more difficult to protect 
consumer welfare through conduct remedies.  Regulating mergers gives the competition 
authority the power to prevent increases in concentrations that are likely to lessen 
competition. 
An important dimension of regulating concentrations is the role of the competition authority in 
privatizations.  As mentioned earlier, a critical danger of privatization in concentrated or 
monopolistic industries is to turn public into private monopolies. The incentives of governments 
(especially the Treasury or the Ministry of Finance) during privatization are towards raising 
maximum revenues to the detriment of developing competition.  This would not only run 
counter to the agenda of developing competition but would also represent a big threat to 
generating political support for the reform agenda. The Turkish experience suggests that 
engaging the competition authority in the privatization process may be an effective way to 
decrease the likelihood that public monopolies are turned into private monopolies.  The 
competition authority in Turkey has taken critical decisions during the privatizations in 
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infrastructure industries such as electricity, telecommunications and transport (ports) as well as 
in tradable industries that have helped reduce (to some extent) the creation of private firms 
that hold excessive market power.   
One important detail in this regard is that normally competition laws do not empower 
competition agencies to prevent ownership changes that do not increase the degree of 
concentration or dominance in the market.  So normally a competition agency would not be 
able to prevent the purchase of a monopoly by a private investor that does not have a prior 
presence in a specific industry.  The Turkish Competition Authority has gone out of its way to 
usurp that power through a communiqué, and for reasons that are hard to understand, this 
(albeit welfare enhancing) transcendence has not been legally or politically challenged.  It may 
be wise to actually endow the competition authority with such power in the laws that form the 
legal basis of privatizations. 
4.5 Empowering consumer groups 
In environments where the risk of capture of the IRA by the firms that it is supposed to regulate 
is relatively high (or where the information advantage of the regulated firm is relatively high) 
one remedy that has been proposed is to develop publicly funded consumer advocacy groups.   
Besides compensating for the threat of capture by firms, establishing publicly funded (but not 
controlled) consumer advocacy groups may help with generating political support for the 
sustainability of the reform program.  Consumer advocacy groups may also help create a wider 
base of legitimacy for the reform program and help with the objective of creating new sources 
of social and political power.  But one should also note that this requires education, expertise, 
and active media etc. The literature suggests that such initiatives may be effective. There is 
empirical evidence, cited in Del Bo (2006) that in the US regulated prices are lower in states 
where there are consumer advocates.   
4.6 Selection of regulators 
There is evidence cited in Dal Bo (2006) that the method of selection of regulators may have an 
impact on regulatory outcomes.  For example, some studies show that when the regulators are 
elected, or appointed by legislators, or when executive appointments require legislative 
approval, regulated prices tend to be lower, possibly reflecting the influence of consumers. It 
should be pointed out that most of these studies are on the US and may be less relevant for 
countries with parliamentary systems, especially when the government parties also hold 
majorities in the parliament. What is not clear in some of this research is whether electoral 
influence works through incentives or through selection of different types of regulators.   Besley 
and Coate (2003) explores the following idea: When regulators are appointed by the executive, 
sensitivity of regulatory policy to voter preferences is dimmed because “regulatory policy 
becomes bundled with other policy issues that the appointing politicians are responsible for.”  
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By contrast, when regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only salient issue so 
that the electoral incentive is to run a pro-consumer candidate. They find evidence that support 
the idea that elected states are more pro-consumer in their regulatory policies in that they 
allow less pass-through of fuel costs to electricity prices.  Overall, these studies suggest that 
elected regulators are more pro-consumer. Of course, this does not immediately suggest that 
from a social welfare point of view this is a better design because it may reflect populism and 
lower than optimal prices, possibly endangering future investments.  On the other hand, in 
environments where capture by regulated firms is the more powerful distortion, elected 
regulators may be a welfare-improving remedy. 
In any case, obviously the preferences of the board or the directors play a crucial role in the 
performance of the agency.  This, in turn, means that the procedure set for the appointment of 
the regulatory agency is very important as well.  Often regulators are appointed either by the 
executive or the legislature. In parliamentary systems, separation of powers is weak so the 
executive branch of the government often has ultimate influence on the appointments.  While 
from a social welfare point of one would desire that people who are appointed would be types 
who would protect the independence of the agency and who would try to encourage decisions 
that would maximize a well accepted measure of welfare (say total or consumer surplus).  
Above all, this would require people with competence and integrity. It is very difficult to find 
procedural ways to reduce the influence of the executive so as to increase the quality of 
appointments.  Perhaps a better way to improve the quality of appointments is to increase the 
transparency of the appointment process.  For example, both the executive and the opposition 
can have the right to nominate candidates, information about whom can be made public before 
the executive makes its final choices.  In addition, the opposition may have the right to question 
the candidates in hearings held at the relevant parliamentary committee.  Under such a 
procedure, the executive would still have the final choice, but may have to better justify its 
choices. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper has drawn from the experience of Turkey to discuss various changes in the 
regulatory environment that can be instrumental in enhancing competition in post-
revolutionary Arab societies.  Presumably the enhancement of competition entails a 
transformation from a regime where profitability relies on special political connections to one 
where success is predominantly driven by productivity.  This in turn requires a policy and 
regulatory framework in which the political authority is constrained in its ability to discriminate 
among firms on the basis of political connections.  
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Establishing a non-discriminatory policy and regulatory framework often entails institutional 
remedies whereby substantial amount of decision and rule making authority is delegated to 
agencies that are relatively independent from the government and individual ministries.  The 
paper has discussed the objectives and characteristics of this delegation, the nature of the 
independence and other dimensions such as accountability and transparency.   
The paper has also reviewed the experience of Turkey where such delegation has occurred in 
the last decade or two, albeit imperfectly and in a way that is non-uniform across sectors.  Even 
in its imperfect form, and where de-facto independence of the new agencies is questionable, it 
has discussed examples where the new rules of the game did have some bite in limiting the 
extent of capture.  It has underlined the particular importance of the role of crises, 
international organizations and the perspective of accession to the EU.  Moreover, it has 
discussed that in the case of Turkey enhanced transparency and accountability in some sectors 
occurred simultaneously with increased discretion in others.  The jury is still out, however, on 
whether the new institutions will survive political dynamics where the EU anchor is becoming 
weaker. 
There is quite a bit of evidence that the presence of IRAs especially in infrastructure industries 
is associated with better performance.  The presence of IRAs also seem to moderate the 
negative impact of corruption on efficiency.  There is also evidence that independence of IRAs is 
higher in environments predicted by theory, that is environments where political 
“replacement” risk is higher and the number of veto players is lower. A final verdict is yet to be 
spelled out but the Turkish experience as well as the empirical evidence suggests that 
institutions that enhance competition may play a role in creating an environment that is more 
conducive to investment and growth. 
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